

Anti-Establishment Party Vote in Europe during the Great Recession


*State of the EU in Canada and the Asia Pacific
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

Anti-Establishment in Europe



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Anti-Establishment in Europe

What accounts for the electoral success of anti-establishment political parties during the past decade?

Macro-Level Explanations

- **Structural** (economy, patterns of migration, etc)
- **Globalization** (Swank and Betz 2003)
- **Increasing global competition – hijacking class-consciousness** (Kitschelt and McGann 1995)
- **Crisis → extremism** (Frey and Weck 1983, Kriesi 2014; Elinas 2013)
- ~~Crisis → extremism~~ (Rydgren 2006; Pammett and Leduc 2013).
- **# of Immigrants → extremism** (Golder 2003; Swank and Betz 2003; Rydgren 2006).

Micro-Level Explanations

- voters' behaviour and attitudes shaping electoral outcomes
- self-ID 'right' vote radical right (Betz 1994)
- FEAR: Views of the econ (vs. GDP, unemployment) (Pammett and Leduc 2013; Daniel Stockemer 2014).
- FEAR: immigration (Koopmans et. Al. 2005)


Anti-Establishment in Europe

SCOPE: → EU member states

METHODOLOGY: → most similar systems design

CASE SELECTION: → 3 pairs in 3 European sub-reg.

→ states with + 1 anti-



→ states with + 1 anti-
corruption systems

Macro-Level Explanations

Table1. Economic Growth and Radical Right Vote in National Elections

(Data obtained from NSD 2014a; NSD 2014b; IMF 2014)

Country	GDP grwth09 (%)	GDP grwth2008-2014 (%)	RR % 2008prior	RR % after 2008	Net Diff.
Germany	-5.09	8.32	0.5	0.4	-0.1
Greece	-3.136	-24.70	3.8	6.92	3.12
Hungary	-6.767	-2.89	2.2	16.7	14.5
Italy	-5.494	-6.79	8.3	4.1	-4.2
Romania	-6.576	8.15	15.1	5.5	-9.6
Sweden	-5.028	8.43	2.9	5.7	2.8

Macro-Level Explanations

Table2. Economic Growth and Left-Libertarian Vote in National Elections

(Data obtained from NSD 2014a; NSD 2014b; IMF 2014)

Country	GDP grwth09	GDP grwth2008-20 14	LL 2008prior	LL after 2008	Net Diff.
Germany	-5.09	8.32	0.1	2	1.9
Greece	-3.136	-24.70	5.04	26.89	21.85
Hungary	-6.767	-2.89	0.1	7.48	7.38
Italy	-5.494	-6.79	1.5	25.5	24
Romania	-6.576	8.15	0.3	0.62	0.32
Sweden	-5.028	8.43	0.63	0.65	0.02

Zero-order correlation between electoral performance and some macro-level economic factors: GDP growth and unemployment

		Correlations									
		Tribune Vote Improved Gain (yes/no)	Radical Right Party Improved Gain (yes/no)	Libertarian New Left Party Improved Gain (yes/no)	Net Gain by Tribune	Net gain by Radical Right	Net Gain by Libertarian New Left	Net GDP Growth in 2009	Net GDP Growth between 2008 to 2014	Unemployment in 2009	Unemployment change between 2008 and 2014
Tribune Vote Improved Gain (yes/no)	Pearson Correlation	1	.447	.632	.697	.644	.400	.459	-.380	.635	.255
	Sig. (2-tailed)		.374	.178	.124	.168	.433	.360	.457	.175	.626
Radical Right Party Improved Gain (yes/no)	Pearson Correlation		1	.000	.494	.771	.051	.310	-.359	.831*	.441
	Sig. (2-tailed)			1.000	.319	.073	.924	.550	.484	.040	.381
Libertarian New Left Party Improved Gain (yes/no)	Pearson Correlation			1	.762	.427	.642	.268	-.621	.526	.334
	Sig. (2-tailed)				.078	.398	.169	.607	.188	.284	.518
Net Gain by Tribune	Pearson Correlation				1	.609	.808	.377	-.835*	.804	.715
	Sig. (2-tailed)					.199	.052	.461	.039	.054	.110
Net gain by Radical Right	Pearson Correlation					1	.024	-.008	-.236	.924**	.112
	Sig. (2-tailed)						.963	.988	.652	.008	.833
Net Gain by Libertarian New Left	Pearson Correlation						1	.481	-.877*	.326	.818*
	Sig. (2-tailed)							.334	.022	.528	.047
Net GDP Growth in 2009	Pearson Correlation							1	-.649	.244	.685
	Sig. (2-tailed)								.163	.641	.133
Net GDP Growth between 2008 to 2014	Pearson Correlation								1	-.578	-.942**
	Sig. (2-tailed)									.230	.005
Unemployment in 2009	Pearson Correlation									1	.476
	Sig. (2-tailed)										.340
Unemployment change between 2008 and 2014	Pearson Correlation										1
	Sig. (2-tailed)										

*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).

**.. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). Tribune Vote Improved, Radical Right Party Vote Improved and Libertarian New Left Party Vote Improved were coded 0=1 (0=No, 1=Yes).

RR success & unemployment rate in 2009

Anti-est. success (L-lib) & GDP growth/unemployment

Zero-order correlation between electoral performance and some macro-level economic factors: GDP growth and unemployment



Anti-est. success (L-lib) & GDP growth/unemployment

Micro / Macro in Sweden

Views of econ

(Jackman & Vopert 1996; Pammet & Leduc 2013)

Views of Immigrants

(Koopmans et Al. 2005; Rydgren 2006)

Trust in Parties

Gender

(Terri Evans 2004)

Education

(Kitschelt & McGann 1995; Daniel Stockemer 2012;2014)

Age

Unemployed / Underemployed

(Kitschelt & McGann 1995)

Micro / Macro in Sweden

Cramer's V measure of association – correlation between a nominal binary variable (voted for RR/did not vote for RR) & binary, ordinal and interval variables

Micro / Macro in Sweden

Table 4. Cramer V indicating associations between Radical-Right party Vote and Micro/ Macro Variables


	Radical Right Party Vote in Sweden	Wages vs. Underemployed	Trust in political parties	How satisfied with present state of economy in country	Immigrants make country worse or better place to live	Gender	Age of respondent, calculated	Highest level of education, Sweden
Radical Right Party Cramer V Vote in Sweden	1	.062	.233	.232	.479	.046	.213	.206

Binary Logistic Regression

Table 5. Coefficients for Binary Logistic Regression explaining Radical Right Party Vote in Sweden

	β	Sig.	Exp(B)
Satisfaction with Economy	-.181	*	0.834
Under/Unemployed	1.254	.	3.504
Immigrants make country better	-.650	***	0.522
Trust in Parties	-.190	*	0.827
Gender	-.539		.583
Age	-.028	**	0.972
Education	-.142	.	0.868

*p<.05
 **p<.01
 ***p<.001
 Nagelkerke R² = .445



Conclusion

→ **Younger voters** slightly more likely to vote RR (Swedish Democrats vote increased by 226%)

→ **Trust in Political Parties** (confirm Cartel-Party thesis)

→ Econ., immigration matter in the context of voters' discontent with way in which pol parties address issues

Limitations:

→ 6 cases, 1 w/ complete data

→ Explain why voters move away from mainstream established parties (not why anti-establishment capitalize most)

→ RR vs RL (Gr, It, Sp) or none (Portugal, Ireland; fall of priates in Ger.)

Conclusion

- Strong relationship b/w – GDP and rising unemployment and rise of anti-establishment parties (mostly RL)
- Age, **satisfaction w/ econ**, attitude towards immigrants and satisfaction w/ current political parties
- influence RR party success